Authoritarian Development and U. But how useful is it as an explanatory device? The Soviets, as Laron rightly points out, were mostly indifferent to Egypt as long as Joseph Stalin reigned.
Other concerns might be raised about some of the American sources that Laron uses to illuminate the internal Egyptian political situation. To them it was the symbol of a new era and an end to foreign domination. The vividness, complexity, and importance of the event also set the stage for challenging and innovative historical reinterpretation. This skeptical treatment of Bandung stands in contrast to the work of other scholars who place more emphasis on transnational ideologies, beliefs, and discourses.
Finally, it would have been useful to have a more significant discussion in this book of how the British reacted to the crisis in Iran during the early 1950s, when Prime Minister Mohammed Mossedegh nationalized the Anglo-Iranian oil company.
Because domestic pressures prevented him from coming out definitively on the Western side in the Cold War, however, U. As a result, the administration abruptly withdrew its offer to help fund the dam.
Laron uses Arabic-language accounts by former Egyptian officials and military officers to help illuminate the inner workings of the Egyptian regime, but the extent to which Laron believes these memoirs can be trusted is unclear. He is the author of The Limits of Detente: You can add this document to your saved list Sign in Available only to authorized users.
The determination with which isolationists around the world resisted U. Laron privileges material interests over ideology elsewhere in The Origins of the Suez Crisis , as well. Nasser was afraid to cooperate too closely with the United States, or to endorse American attempts to broker an Arab-Israeli peace, because he worried about hostile public opinion in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world; in other words, he feared losing the support of the isolationist effendia 140.
Cambridge University Press, 2007. He received his Ph.
At the end of this book, we still do not know. Laron similarly adds a welcome new layer to American policy regarding Suez by moving beyond the heretofore dominant East-West paradigm and highlighting the domestic U.
First, I would like to heartily thank Thomas Maddux for organizing this roundtable and the reviewers for devoting their time to reading and writing about my book — not a small thing in an increasingly demanding academic environment.
Routladge 2009 , pp 77-128.